The “Tariff of Abominations”: The Tariff of 1828 and a Divided Nation

How a tax on imported goods became a test of who benefits from national economic policy, who pays for it, and what a state can do when it objects.

On May 19, 1828, President John Quincy Adams approved a law raising duties on imported goods, including woolens, iron, hemp, and molasses.1 Its formal title was “An Act in alteration of the several acts imposing duties on imports.”2 Southern opponents gave it a more enduring name: the “Tariff of Abominations.”

The law exposed the competing interests within a developing national economy. Duties that protected one producer could raise another’s costs, and the divisions ran both between regions and within them. Over the next four years, opposition to the tariff helped produce a constitutional confrontation: could a state declare a federal law unconstitutional and block its enforcement?

What a Tariff Did

Revenue and Protection

A printed page from the U.S. Statutes at Large showing the title of the 1828 act altering duties on imports.
“An Act in alteration of the several acts imposing duties on imports,” approved May 19, 1828, as printed on page 270 of the U.S. Statutes at Large. The page’s footnote lists the later acts of 1832, 1833, and 1842 that amended it.

A tariff is a tax on imported goods, collected when they enter the country. In the early republic, tariffs served two purposes. They raised money for the federal government, and they could protect American producers by making foreign goods more expensive. A high duty on British cloth, for example, gave American cloth makers room to charge more and still win customers.

The two purposes did not always point in the same direction. A tariff set mainly for revenue could be moderate and broad. A tariff set mainly for protection might be high on the specific goods that competed with American products. During the 1820s, the balance shifted toward protection. Economist Douglas Irwin reports that the average tariff on dutiable imports “rose sharply” during the decade, peaking at more than 60 percent in 1830.3

Different Regions, Different Interests

Those rising rates landed differently across the country. Manufacturers in the Northeast and producers of raw materials such as wool, hemp, and iron in the middle and western states could gain from protection. The South’s plantation economy depended heavily on enslaved labor to produce export crops, especially cotton.4 Its leading planters bought manufactured goods from abroad and from other U.S. regions, making them hostile to duties that could raise those goods’ prices. For them, a protective tariff meant paying more for what they bought while doing little to raise the price of what they sold.

The divisions were not only regional. The same law could protect one producer while raising costs for another. Duties on raw materials could burden businesses that relied on imported inputs, even as tariffs on finished goods offered protection from foreign competition. Its benefits and burdens divided regions, but they also divided businesses within them.

South Carolina’s legislature later put the Southern objection directly. Its Exposition and Protest, first reported in December 1828 and printed in 1829, described the state as “wholly dependent upon agriculture and commerce, not only for her prosperity, but for her very existence as a state.”5 It added that the valuable products of the state’s soil were “among the very few that can be cultivated with any profit by slave labor.” The protest went on to argue that the power to protect manufactures “is no where expressly granted to Congress.”

The Case for Protection

Supporters of protective tariffs had their own regional and national arguments. The most influential was Henry Clay of Kentucky, whose program became known as the American System. According to the U.S. Senate Historical Office, the program was “devised in the burst of nationalism that followed the War of 1812” and joined three parts: “a tariff to protect and promote American industry,” a national bank, and federal support for roads and canals.6 Clay argued that a nation whose regions depended on one another would no longer need to rely on British manufactured goods.

In this view, a protective tariff was not a gift to one region but an investment in national independence. Factories in the Northeast would buy cotton from the South and food from the West, and farmers would gain a home market for their crops instead of depending on foreign buyers. Recent experience gave the argument force. Irwin notes that the “dramatic reduction in trade” during the War of 1812 is commonly believed to have spurred early American manufacturing.3

Southern critics answered that the benefits flowed one way. The Senate account notes that opponents, including Hayne and Calhoun, warned that protective tariffs would “ruin the region’s economy.”6 Both sides claimed to speak for the national interest. The disagreement was over whose interests the nation’s economic policy should serve, and who should carry its costs.

Writing the Bill

Duties on Raw Materials

A broadside headed “Jackson and the Nullifiers,” with an engraved portrait of Andrew Jackson framed by flags, cannon, and a “New Orleans” banner above three columns of song verses.
A New York broadside from 1832, one of many printed responses to South Carolina’s nullification of the tariff acts. Its pro-Jackson verses, sung to “Yankee Doodle,” show how the dispute played out in popular print as well as in Congress.

The bill emerged in early 1828 from the House Committee on Manufactures, chaired by Representative Rollin Mallary of Vermont, as the country prepared for a presidential election between Adams and Andrew Jackson. Economist F. W. Taussig, writing in 1892, notes that Mallary, an Adams supporter, introduced and explained the committee’s bill but opposed it and moved to amend it substantially.7 The bill proposed high duties not only on finished manufactured goods but also on raw materials. Taussig quotes Mallary as saying that “the committee gave the manufacturer of iron all he asked, even more.” He observed that a higher duty on hemp would “burden the rope makers and the users of cordage,” and that the duty on molasses, used in New England’s rum distilleries, “was to be doubled.”

Those duties ran counter to some of the very manufacturers a protective tariff was supposed to help. New England’s woolen mills, for instance, needed raw wool. Higher duties on imported wool raised their costs even as the bill offered protection on finished cloth.

Political Strategy, and Its Limits

Why would a protective tariff include provisions that burdened protected industries? Historians have long described parts of the bill as an election-year maneuver intended to divide Adams’s supporters. In Taussig’s account, Jackson’s supporters in Congress framed the bill so that it would be “obnoxious to the New England members,” who leaned toward Adams.7 Taussig wrote that “the result expected was that no tariff bill at all would be passed during the session.” Jackson’s allies could then claim credit with protection-minded voters in the middle and western states for having supported a tariff, while New England’s votes against it embarrassed the Adams camp.

Taussig did not rest this account on inference alone. He drew partly on Calhoun’s own explanation, given “very frankly nine years later” in an 1837 speech reviewing the events of 1828.7 Calhoun said the arrangement between Southern members and Jackson’s Northern allies had come about mainly through Silas Wright of New York, and Taussig notes that Wright did not deny it. Taussig also wrote that Southern members “openly said that they meant to make the tariff so bitter a pill that no New England member would be able to swallow it.”

That account deserves scrutiny, since it rests in part on a participant’s recollection years after the fact. But it is more than speculation about hidden motives. The bill also reflected genuine demands for protection, and enough members ultimately supported it to secure passage. On April 22, 1828, the House passed the bill.1 The vote was 105 to 94.8 The Senate approved it by a final vote of 26 to 21.9 Adams signed it on May 19. The tariff, which its critics called an abomination, became law.

The Response

An Election and an Anonymous Pamphlet

The tariff became part of a bitter presidential campaign. In November 1828, Jackson defeated Adams. John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, who had served as vice president under Adams, was elected vice president again, this time alongside Jackson.

Title page reading “Exposition and Protest, reported by the Special Committee of the House of Representatives, on the Tariff; read and ordered to be printed, Dec. 19th, 1828,” printed in Columbia, South Carolina, in 1829.
Published in 1829, this pamphlet brought together an Exposition secretly drafted by John C. Calhoun and South Carolina’s formal Protest against the protective tariff.

Calhoun also worked on a response to the tariff. In late 1828, he secretly drafted an Exposition challenging the protective tariff and developing the constitutional argument associated with nullification.1 The South Carolina legislature published the Exposition the following year in amended form, together with its own formal Protest against the tariff.10 The Exposition laid out a constitutional theory. “The general government is one of specific powers,” it argued, able to exercise “only the powers expressly granted” and those “necessary and proper” to carry them out.5 Because its author believed the protective tariff exceeded those powers, the Exposition argued that a state, as a party to the federal compact, could judge whether an act of Congress was unconstitutional and declare it void within its borders. The legislature’s accompanying Protest condemned the tariff as “unconstitutional, oppressive, and unjust.”5

Calhoun’s authorship was kept secret at the time. A sitting vice president, elected on the same ticket as the incoming president, was outlining a theory under which a state could block the enforcement of a federal law it judged unconstitutional. That theory came to be called nullification.

Webster and Hayne

The argument soon moved to the floor of the United States Senate. In late December 1829, Senator Samuel Foot of Connecticut proposed a resolution to limit western land sales.11 What began as a debate over public lands quickly widened into a debate over tariffs, sectional interests, and the nature of the Union.

In speeches on January 21 and 25, 1830, Senator Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina attacked Northern support for protective tariffs and defended a state’s authority to resist a federal law it judged unconstitutional.11 In the Senate Historical Office’s summary of his view, the states were sovereign and had ceded only limited powers to the national government. When that government overstepped those limits, a state could oppose the action until three-fourths of the states settled the question by constitutional amendment.

Senator Daniel Webster of Massachusetts answered over two days, January 26 and 27. He rejected a single state’s claim to make that judgment binding, argued for a stronger national government, and warned that nullification would lead to civil war. He closed with words that became among the most quoted in American political history: “Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable.”12

A large painting of the U.S. Senate chamber crowded with senators and spectators as Daniel Webster stands to speak.
George P. A. Healy completed this painting in 1851, two decades after the debate it depicts, so it is a later artistic interpretation rather than a record of the scene. It shows Daniel Webster’s January 1830 reply to Senator Robert Y. Hayne and hangs today in the Great Hall of Faneuil Hall in Boston.

From Tariff to Crisis

The Tariff of 1832 and Nullification

Congress revised the tariff on July 14, 1832, lowering some rates but keeping the principle of protection.13 For leaders in South Carolina, the revision was not enough. In November 1832, a state convention adopted an Ordinance of Nullification declaring the tariff acts of 1828 and 1832 “null, void, and no law” within the state.14

President Jackson rejected South Carolina’s claim. On December 10, 1832, he issued a Proclamation to the People of South Carolina disputing a state’s right to nullify federal law.14 Calhoun, elected to the Senate on December 12, 1832, resigned the vice presidency on December 28 and took a seat where he could defend his state’s position directly.15

A Compromise

The confrontation ended with a two-part settlement in March 1833. Congress passed the Force Act, authorizing the president to use military force to collect duties if necessary.14 It also passed the Compromise Tariff, approved on March 2, 1833, which reduced duties above 20 percent in stages through 1842.16 Henry Clay helped broker the compromise with Calhoun, and South Carolina eventually accepted it, ending the nullification crisis.14

The tariff of 1828 and the nullification crisis were connected, but they were separate events. The tariff was a law about import duties, passed by Congress and signed by Adams. The nullification crisis began four years later, under Jackson, in response to both the 1828 tariff and its 1832 revision. Our companion article on the nullification crisis examines that confrontation in greater detail. What matters here is the line that connects the two episodes. The fight over the Tariff of 1828 began as an argument about who should pay for national economic policy. Within four years, it had become an argument about whether a state could declare a federal law unconstitutional and prevent its enforcement within its borders.

The Changing Course of Tariff Policy

The high rates associated with the 1828 tariff did not remain unchanged. The Compromise Tariff of 1833 scheduled reductions through 1842, but Congress raised duties again that year in a measure Taussig described as “distinctively protective.”17 The Walker Tariff of 1846, enacted under President James K. Polk and named for his Treasury secretary, Robert J. Walker, subsequently lowered duties. Despite these reversals, the longer-term trend from 1830 to 1860 was downward. Irwin places the average tariff on dutiable imports below 20 percent by the Civil War.3

Tariffs were only one legal tool Americans used in these decades to encourage domestic industry. Another was the patent system, which rewarded inventors with a temporary right to their inventions. Both aimed to build American manufacturing, but they worked in very different ways and produced different winners. The final article in this series follows that second tool through the story of Elias Howe and the sewing machine.

What the Test Revealed

The tariff of 1828 tested how a national economy would divide its benefits and costs. Manufacturers and raw-material producers in some regions stood to gain from protection. Exporting planters in the South argued that they paid much of the cost, and some Northern businesses bore costs of their own. Because the national government set one tariff for the whole country, that division could not be settled region by region. Congress had to settle it, through elections and, eventually, in a contest over the Constitution itself.

The arguments made in these years, about a state’s right to judge federal law and the people’s claim to a permanent Union, did not end with the compromise of 1833. They returned again and again in the decades before the Civil War.

Readers are left to weigh the questions. Who gained from the Tariff of 1828, and who paid for it? Was a high protective tariff a fair way to build American industry, or an unfair burden on one part of the country? What did this test reveal about the role government should play in the economy, and who gets to decide?

This article is the second in Building an Economy: Credit, Conflict, and Invention. The next article examines the Panic of 1837; the final installment explores patents and invention through Elias Howe and the sewing machine.

Companion articles: Henry Clay and the Art of Buying Time, Andrew Jackson: An American Life and Legacy, James K. Polk and the Expansion of the United States, and The Compromise of 1850.

Continue exploring our other History Lessons.

Image Resources

  • The Tariff of 1828 in the U.S. Statutes at Large (4 Stat. 270)
    U.S. Congress, “An Act in alteration of the several acts imposing duties on imports,” May 19, 1828, 4 Stat. 270, U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 4, Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/item/llsl-v4/
  • Exposition and Protest (South Carolina, published 1829)
    South Carolina State Library, Digital Collections, “Exposition and protest” (1829). Public domain. https://dc.statelibrary.sc.gov/handle/10827/21911
  • “Jackson and the nullifiers” (broadside, 1832)
    Jackson and the nullifiers … New York: Printed and sold, wholesale and retail, at 257 Hudson-street, and 138 Division-street, 1832. Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/item/2020775322/
  • Webster Replying to Hayne, by George P. A. Healy (1851)
    George Peter Alexander Healy, Webster Replying to Hayne, 1851. Image via World History Encyclopedia, uploaded March 10, 2025. Public domain. https://www.worldhistory.org/image/20167/websters-reply-to-hayne/